What are the main reasons behind the regulation of political parties by contemporary constitutional practices? This article presents a framework for analysis which identifies types of justifications and actors involved in the process of regulation and their further influence on the outcomes of constitutionalization. The empirical focus is on the revelatory case of Luxembourg, which amended the constitution for the sole reason of giving parties constitutional status. The analysis suggests that the constitutional regulation of political parties depends on their current interests and power status. Additionally, the paper draws attention to the involvement of external actors and nevertheless to the changing nature of contemporary constitutionalism.
Introduction
Scholars have recently begun to closely examine party regulations in democracies both old and new (see Barnedt, 1998; Janda, 2005; Müller and Sieberer, 2006; Reilly, 2006; Bogaards et al, 2010; van Biezen 2012; Rashkova and van Biezen 2014) . In addition to ordinary laws, countries have increasingly sought to regulate political parties by noting them in their constitutions. This article enquires into why constitutions have become a prime agency for regulating political parties. It concentrates on the demand for constitutional regulation of parties by examining the relevant actors involved in the process. Based on insights from the literature on political parties, constitutionalism and on theories of regulation, it explains why parties are included as a constitutional feature in contemporary democracies and what the implications are for political systems.
After the Second World War (WWII), political parties have progressively been regulated by the constitutions of European democracies and recognised in constitutional terms as necessary institutional components of the democratic system. Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany were among the first countries to note political parties in their new constitutions of 1947 and 1949, respectively. These countries' initiative of party constitutionalisation has been followed in waves by the large majority of European democracies. In the majority of postmodern European countries, parties were included in the new constitutions adopted in the post-war, postindependence or post-authoritarian regime period. After the first post-war constitutionalisation of parties, several constitutions were amended to strengthen or expand the role of political parties (Biezen and Borz 2012) .
Previous scholarship has focused on how the constitutional regulation of parties is worded (van Biezen, 2012) and analysed the content of European constitutional regulations or discussed the reasons behind the lack of party constitutionalisation in common law countries (Gauja, 2010) .
This article complements previous research by discussing the question of why countries adopt party constitutional regulation. Little is known regarding the demand for party constitutionalisation, the actors involved in the process and their justifications. These aspects are addressed by this article through an analytical framework of party constitutional regulation in a democratic system. This article discusses the case of Luxembourg, which provides valuable insights into the process of party constitutional regulation. Luxembourg is a 'party amendment only' case that offers a better opportunity for analysis (cf. Yin, 2003) in comparison with cases in which the constitutional articles on parties were amended in larger processes of constitutional reform. Until 2008, in addition to the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland, Luxembourg was one of the few countries in Europe that did not mention political parties in their written constitutions. The country's basic law was revised in 2008 solely to introduce a special article on political parties.
Political parties in Luxembourg were already subject to regulation via the 1999 ordinary law on the reimbursement of campaign expenses. Furthermore, a constitutional amendment is a timeconsuming and costly procedure that usually requires a qualified majority and the agreement of the actors involved (Rasch and Congleton, 2005; Tsebelis, 2002) . Thus, the Luxembourg case is revelatory because it provides an opportunity to analyse those justifications, which solely explain the salience of constitutionalising parties, while it controls for all other intervening influences.
The article proceeds as follows: first, it presents a framework for analysing the constitutional regulation of parties, which bridges theoretical arguments from scholarship on political parties, new constitutionalism and economic regulation. Second, this article illustrates the framework by using the case of Luxembourg and presenting the forces behind the 2008 constitutional revision and their justifications. This article then concludes by assessing the implications of a contemporary constitutional revision on the importance attributed to political parties in contemporary democracies.
General framework for party constitutional regulation
Party constitutional regulation, whether detailed or symbolic in its content, first and foremost represents the recognition of parties as necessary institutions in the political system. Party constitutional regulation is different from legal party regulation for various reasons. The constitution sets the principles to be followed by ordinary laws, it provides rigidity and stability to parties' acquired legal status, it avoids ad-hoc secondary legislation designed to favour partisan interests (Gauja, 2010) , and recently, it adapts and reflects contemporary changes in parties' status from being mainly outside the reach of the state to being in need of state resources (Biezen and Kopecky, 2014) .
The framework advanced in this article illustrates the justifications behind different models of party constitutional regulation (see table 1 ). It considers the actors involved in the constitutional revision process (parties, national institutions, and external actors) and presents their justifications. It further advances propositions on the relation between justifications and the expected content of constitutional regulation. This framework complements previous scholarship by Renwick (2010) and Nwokora (2014) , which discusses competitive, cooperative and ideological strategies in adopting electoral and party finance laws. In contrast to the latter, party constitutional regulation involves a constitutional revision procedure that operates by different rules. There are more incentives for cooperation and cartel behaviour given the need for a qualified majority to pass amendments and more contemporary involvement of international actors.
Although the content of party constitutionalisation has been previously examined from a comparative perspective (see van Biezen and Borz 2012) , the framework presented here emphasises the justifications for constitutional regulation. As detailed below, these have been derived following a combination of a deductive approach with cues from new constitutionalism (j1, j5, j6), economic regulation and party theory (j2, j3, j4), with an inductive approach through process tracing. The latter clarified the key actors and steps in the contemporary constitutional revision process.
In addressing the question of why parties are included in the constitutions of democratic states, one needs to acknowledge how ideas regarding constitutions and constitutionalism have changed over time. The old liberal and republican doctrines of constitutionalism assigned three functions to a modern constitution: creation of a political entity, establishment of its fundamental institutional structure, and limitations on the exercise of political power (Murphy, 1993; Castiglione, 1996) . With time, as individual rights became more important, constitutions became structures of political legitimation (Sartori, 1994; Bartolini, 2010) . This approach emphasises that new constitutionalism should move beyond 'the traditional concern of limiting the exercise of political power' (Elkin, 1993: 21) . Its analytical relevance for party constitutionalisation is based on highlighting (1) the membership of citizens in political parties, (2) parties as necessary institutions that contribute to the balance of interests within society and (3) the role of judicial review through constitutional courts.
First, contemporary constitutionalism focuses on citizenship as a form of responsible membership in institutions, such as states, corporations, unions or political parties, in which membership is regarded as a voluntary association of principals (Elkin, 1993) . Subsequently, the practice in contemporary democracies is to delegate the task of representation to political parties.
Constitutions now recognise parties as the agents of citizens, who are the ultimate principals in a democracy. Second, the competition between political parties in elections and in parliament offers a balance of power that creates government accountability to the electorate (Bellamy, 2007) .
Consequently, representative democracies recognise political parties in their constitutions as institutions that contribute to the balance of interests within society. Third, new constitutionalism emphasises the role of judicial review and of constitutional courts in assessing the constitutional legality of other legal norms and in ensuring that political elites are acting upon democratic principles (Stone Sweet 2000) . Therefore, Constitutional Courts can exercise checks on the activity and behaviour of political parties.
What one must consider when discussing contemporary constitutionalism is the influence of external actors on national constitutional practices. When international actors become involved in national politics, constitutional independence is ceded and sovereign equality is transformed. By the end of the 20 th century, constitutionalism had already moved beyond the state. The European Union has the need to address recognition of its structures in a constitutional framework (Wiener, 2007) . Constitutions consider the policy-making needs of contemporary policies (Elkin, 1993) and recognise that in contemporary democracies, the task of representation is delegated to political parties. From this follows the need to introduce parties in the constitution or have a stipulation regarding further secondary legislation on party finance or party organisation.
Similar to constitutions and constitutionalism, political parties have undergone various stages of development from cadre and mass parties to catch-all and, later, cartel parties that are more and more financially dependent on the state (Katz and Mair, 1995) . These parties' constitutional regulation has become progressively more extensive. In terms of content, the models of party constitutional regulation have developed differently in the period since WWII (see van Biezen 2012) . Immediately after the war and from the 1970s until late 1989, the emphasis was on parties in public office (government, parliament and their role in elections). After the 1990s, the emphasis changed towards a party constitutional regulation model aimed at defending democracy.
It is under this model that the extra-parliamentary party (i.e., conditions and limitations to membership in political parties) is defined by constitutions together with rights and freedoms expressed by parties (i.e., freedom of association). However, the constitutional regulation of parties as a special type of public utility in relation to democratic principles has received minimal focus after the war but increased in importance in the 1970s (Portugal) and more recently after 2000 (Switzerland and Luxembourg).
Political actors and their justifications
To explain why countries adopt party constitutional regulation, this paper analyses the demand for constitutional regulation. This demand may originate from different societal and political actors with different justifications. The actors are expected to be political parties, national institutions or other organisations such as the media or non-governmental organisations (NGOs), local constituents or international organisations.
To understand the need for regulation of political parties by constitutions, one can draw on the economic theory of regulation, which argues that 'as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefits' (Stigler, 1971: 3) . Similarly, by applying this logic, it is to be expected that party constitutional regulation will be acquired and designed primarily for the benefit of parties, particularly the incumbents who are the primary actors involved. It is parties that control the process of constitutional revision, and no amendment would pass without their agreement. Parties' interests are related to power, expressed as office, policy or votes (Strøm 1990); however, before such goals are realised, they are also interested in organisational survival. Hence, the parties' justifications strive to meet those interests. From the perspective of parties and of other actors involved, one can identify at least six justifications and benefits of constitutional regulation.
First, the legitimation of parties' institutional agency role (j1) and hence the recognition of their importance as agents of citizens in a democracy. Parties' legitimation as agents provides the acknowledgement of being part of the power structure and provides legal status to the link with voters and with deputies elected on parties' electoral list. Direct recognition in a constitutional article legally validates parties' roles and activities; it further institutionalises the delegation chain from voters to party representatives in the parliament. Direct recognition makes parties' place in the political system entrenched by the country's higher law, which is ultimately more stable and less prone to change in comparison with an ordinary law. The third justification ( [ Table 1 . about here]
The fifth justification (j5) is related to the place that political parties have acquired in a political system and the need to prevent any misuse of power via special oversight and restrictions. The objective is to protect the democratic system against corrupt activities and to ensure that the behaviour and activities of parties run in accordance with the higher law of the country. Consequently, parties will become more accountable; their activity will be more transparent and more public.
Although mainly addressed by state institutions, opposition parties are also expected to resort to this justification.
The sixth justification (j6) for party constitutional regulation is legal administrative necessity or efficiency gains for all actors involved in the process. Constitutional regulation offers the basis for compliance with secondary legislation on parties and the need for its rigorous application. Additionally, when confronted with various cases that involve political parties, courts will find it easier to make normative and empirical judgements regarding political dynamics and entities, which they can identify and for which they will find legitimacy in the constitution.
The type of justification depends on the political actors involved in the process of constitutional regulation (see table 1 ). The initiative can originate from any actor; however, the entire process of constitutional regulation can involve all of them. Scandals (corruption, fiscal evasion) may prompt reform, and politicians may not discuss them extensively; in this case, it is the media,
NGOs or external actors that may play a proactive role and push the reform forward. The actors'
positions will follow national and international legal practices.
Established political parties with or without parliamentary representation can resort to these justifications as single actors (table 1) . Partisan institutions such as the parliament and the government are also expected to justify the constitutional legitimation of parties on similar lines as parties themselves, given the entrenchment of parties in the state institutions, but on a collective basis. These institutions' official position is predicted to reflect the position of parties in government more. Other advisory national bodies involved are envisaged to present justifications related to democracy and the appropriate functioning of a political system, such as legitimation, prevention of misuse of power and legal administrative efficiency. The external non-state actors (international organisations, press, and public pressure) involved in the process are more likely to advance the last two justifications because their function is to monitor national democratic standards.
Justifications and constitutionalisation outcomes
The type(s) of justification brought forward by actors can impact the preferred degree and type of constitutional regulation. The institutional role for democracy can be legitimised via less regulation, whereas preventing misuse of power and administrative efficiency both imply further constitutional stipulations and restrictions on parties' organisation and activities. In terms of content, three models of party constitutionalisation have been identified in previous comparative studies of post-war European constitutions: 'public utilities', 'parties in public office' and 'defending democracy' (see van Biezen and Borz 2012) . Each model of party constitutionalisation can be linked to more than one justification (see table 1 ).
How each justification is related to the three models of party constitutionalisation is detailed below and expressed in Propositions 1-3. Proposition 4 explains the evolution of a constitutional amendment from the proposal to the adoption stage. As countries adopt party constitutional regulation tailored mainly around one dominant model (van Biezen 2012), one case can verify one proposition (P1-P3) at a specific point in time. At the most, one case (country) can offer a valid test of propositions across time.
Justifications become dominant when a majority of actors agree on a particular proposal by providing similar motivations to back their position. These motivations are expected to invoke binding constitutional principles (democracy, representation, and rule of law), which are the foundations for each constitutionalisation model and which will subsequently be reflected in the proposed text. Dominant justifications will reveal parties' interests and power status or be the result of particular events such as political scandals or external influence. Contagion from other countries, following certain political events, may play a role in influencing the reform text.
Justifications along the line of democratic institutional legitimation and organisational survival in both old and new democracies are expected to accompany the elite's choice for a proposal that emphasises parties' roles as public utilities. The country's constitutional revision procedure requires amendments to be adopted by the Chamber of Deputies during the same term, in two successive votes, separated by an interval of at least three months (Schmit, 2009) , each with at least two-thirds of its members of Parliament (MPs). Another national actor involved is the advisory Council of State, which is perceived as a substitute for a second chamber and has 21 politically affiliated members appointed for 15 years.
The Council can suggest adaptations and modifications to bills and proposals (Dumont and De Winter, 2003) , and if it chooses not to exempt the Chamber from the second vote, it can delay the adoption of bills by at least three months (Dumont and Poirier, 2007) . Table 1 .
Why include parties in the constitution of Luxembourg: justifications and outcomes
The 2001 (table 2 Online Appendix), is parties as public utilities because parties were associated mainly with democratic principles such as pluralism, popular will, and universal suffrage.
The dominant justification behind the need for a constitutional regulation was agency legitimation and 2009, the government was formed by the LSAP and CSV, who were short of two MPs to achieve the qualified majority needed to pass the constitutional amendment. As shown in table 2 Online Appendix, the successful proposal, which the Parliament adopted, originated from the governing party. Opposition parties were consistently in favour of more extensive regulation but, once in government (LSAP), also ready to accommodate the preferences of their coalition partner Another explanatory factor for why previous proposals were not endorsed, is the constitutional revision procedure, which, until December 2003, involved the automatic 'dissolution' of the Chamber (art 114 of the Constitution) once the legislature declares the need for revision. This explains why early proposals were advanced by opposition parties with hopes of winning the elections following the process of dissolution. The new procedure (see Online Appendix), which follows from the process of European integration, is less rigid, requires votes during the same legislative term and overall provides more incentives for consensus across parties.
Conclusion and implications
This article addressed the question of why contemporary constitutions regulate political parties. It introduced a framework for analysis that consists of actors involved in the process, their interests and justifications. Although the outcome of regulation conveys 'public' goods, parties also want 'private' benefits from regulation: acknowledgement, subsidies, restriction of competition from anti-system parties, role distinction from 'rivals', and guarantees against any misuse of power. is needed to test all four propositions advanced in this paper.
First, the implications of the contemporary constitutional regulation of parties are related to the increased importance and recognition of parties as indispensable agents of democracy as stated by Schattschneider (1942) . Second, the constitutional regulation notes the transformation of political parties and their entrenchment in state institutions. Third, the constitutionalisation is increasingly under the influence of external forces, which suggests that, to a certain degree, contemporary constitutionalism does indeed extend beyond the state. Constitutionalisation considers international practices and can respond to the necessities of the state, as well as to the necessities of the national and international political actors. Whilst the real interests of parties cannot be entirely gauged through interviews and the examination of parliamentary debates, the analysis presented in this paper rests with the justifications brought forward by all actors involved in the process of amending the constitution. Specific justifications were identified in official institutional responses to proposals of revision (see table 1 ). These responses were issued by individual and collective national and international actors, in the parliamentary debates specially organised for this purpose. Generally, they took the form of position papers/opinions. Additionally, they were cross validated by face to face interviews with Luxembourgish political elite.
The process of constitutional revision is led by the Commission on Institutions and Constitutional Affairs (Gerkrath 2013) , whose members represent all party groups. Their discussions are influenced by the position paper of the government and the advisory opinion of the Council of State and the Venice Commission. Since 2003, the Commission brings the proposal into the plenary session of the Chamber where modifications to the constitution are agreed by two-thirds majority. ' The institutional legitimation that political parties can acquire with article 32bis, will permit them to influence and to establish a formal linkage with their' deputies.' (Schmit, 2009: 177) Organizational survival 'Considering the crucial role parties and political groups play in the formation and expression of popular will, their financing needs to be assured essentially through Deputes (2001 Deputes ( , 2002b Deputes ( , 2004b Deputes ( , 2007c 
